Legitimacy in Social Reform Litigation:  An Empirical Study by Wilton, Timothy
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 15
1982 
Legitimacy in Social Reform Litigation: An Empirical Study 
Timothy Wilton 
Wayne State University Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Social Welfare Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Timothy Wilton, Legitimacy in Social Reform Litigation: An Empirical Study, 15 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 189 
(1982). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol15/iss2/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
LEGITIMACY IN SOCIAL REFORM 
LITIGATION: AN EMPIRICAL 
STUDY 
Timothy Wilton* 
Modern American society has experienced an increased em-
phasis upon judicial intervention as a mechanism for social re-
form. 1 Starting with the desegregation cases, advocates seeking 
social change on behalf of ethnic minorities/1 prisoners3 and 
mental patients;' welfare recipients,11 women,6 and numerous 
other disadvantaged groups have pursued litigation, particularly 
constitutional litigation in the federal courts, as the b'est means 
for achieving their goals.7 Each victory has triggered countless 
• Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School. B.A., 1968, J.D., 1971, 
LL.M., 1977, Harvard University. This project was supported by a grant from Wayne 
State University. I am grateful for the extraordinarily able assistance of Wendy Welkom 
University of Michigan Law School J.D., 1982 in the planning and data-gathering phases 
of the study. · 
l. See Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 18 (1979) ("the focus of structural reform is not upon particular inci-
dents or transactions, but rather upon the conditions of social life and the role that 
large-scale organizations play in determining those conditions"); Miller, Of Frankenstein 
Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Actions Problem," 92 
HARV. L. REV. 664, 668-76 (1979). 
2. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) 
(seeking rezoning of land to permit the construction of racially integrated housing); San 
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (attacking the state system 
of financing public education as discrimination against the poor and minority groups). 
3. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (challenging conditions of confine-
ment and various practices in facility housing pretrial detainees); Campbell v. Cauthron, 
623 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding conditions in county jail to be unconstitutional in 
several respects). 
4. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (seeking declaratory judgment that 
procedures for voluntary commitment of juveniles to state mental hospitals contravened 
the fourteenth amendment); Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982) (attack upon state 
mental institution policies regarding the medication and seclusion of patients). 
5. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (finding constitutional infirmities 
in the procedures employed for terminating welfare benefits); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618 (1969) (holding that a one-year residency requirement utilized by several states 
to limit welfare benefits was unconstitutional). 
6. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (urging that state should be constitu-
tionally obligated to fund nontherapeutic abortions); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 
(1974) (challenging state disability insurance program which excluded pregnancy benefits 
from the scope of its coverage). 
7. See Statement of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., et al (April 11, 1963), reprinted in 
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 323-24 (1967); Neuborne, The Myth of 
189 
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new claims, resulting in an "explosion" of judicially discovered 
rights and proceedings to enforce them. 8 
This expanded judicial involvement has created intensified 
opposition to social reform litigation.9 Attorneys in these cases 
have been suspected of pursuing their own agenda for social re-
form rather than the specific interests of their clients. If this 
indeed is the case, then individual disputes that could be infor-
mally resolved may instead become formal lawsuits, thus po-
larizing disputants' positions and requiring a judge to decide so-
cial issues. 
Moreover, in many instances substantial resistance has devel-
oped to implementation of court-ordered remedies. Thus, par-
ents have kept their children home rather than sending them to 
desegregated schools, 10 and staffs in prisons and mental hospi-
tals have threatened to strike when confronted with judicial de-
crees mandating changes in institutional operations. 11 The most 
problematic resistance, however, lies not in these incidents of 
open defiance, which can readily be identified and addressed by 
traditional police measures or contempt proceedings.12 Rather, 
the more fundamental obstacle to social reform litigation is the 
quiet resistance at the bottom of bureaucracies: from the teacher 
Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1115-16 (1977). 
8. See Cahn & Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?-The Public Interest in 
Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005, 1008-10 (1970). 
9. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA o, PROGRESS (1970); Bork, 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). 
10. For example, the order to desegregate the Boston Public Schools in Morgan v. 
Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass.), aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 
(1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975), met with violent resistance. See Bell, 
Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation 
Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 482 (1976). See generally Comment, Community Resis-
tance to School Desegregation: Enjoining the Undefinable Class, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 111 
(1976). 
11. See, e.g., Affidavits in Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in 
part and rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 
102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
12. Judges often are reluctant to use contempt power, perhaps because they think the 
public does not fully support the legitimacy of the underlying order. See, e.g., Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1299, 1314 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (school 
discrimination case), aff'd in part, 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970), aff'd in part and rev'd in 
part, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (affirming district court). Despite repeated orders, see 300 F. 
Supp. 1358 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (order of Apr. 23); id. at 1381 (order of June 20); 306 F. 
Supp. 1291 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (order of Aug. 15), the defendant school board failed to 
submit and implement a satisfactory school desegregation plan. When, on November 17, 
1969, the board failed to comply with still another deadline, the plaintiffs moved for 
contempt citations against members of the board. Though admitting that the "evidence 
might very well support such citations," 306 F. Supp. at 1314, the court deferred action, 
stating that contempt citations would be avoided if possible. See also Interview with M. 
Davidson, in M. MELTSNER & P. SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST AovocACY 257, 258 (1974). 
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in the classroom, the prison guard in the cellblock, or the at-
tendant in the mental ward-people harboring deep-seated re-
sentment and hostility that cannot be changed by contempt pro-
ceedings but which nonetheless will quite effectively sabotage a 
court's remedial program. 
This Article undertakes a detailed examination of a single 
lawsuit, Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Chil-
dren v. Ann Arbor School District Board.18 This study first ex-
plores the diversity of interests present among both the plaintiff 
and defendant groups in King, and analyzes the performance of 
the attorneys in representing these interests. The Article then 
turns to the problems of resistance that arise at the decree stage 
in social reform litigation, and presents an empirical evaluation 
of the factors influencing the response to judicially mandated 
relief. 
In many ways, King is typical of social reform litigation. The 
plaintiffs were a large, heterogeneous group with personal griev-
ances that were changed and expanded when translated into le-
gal claims by attorneys cooperating with a social reform organi-
zation. The result was a lawsuit seeking affirmative injunctive 
relief from a defendant bureaucracy having varied levels of au-
thority and responsibility. Careful study of this litigation dem-
onstrates that lawyers pursuing social reform often must choose 
a focus from among the variety of interests contained within 
their complex client entity, including both formal parties and in-
formal allies. This process can result in litigation focusing on is-
sues only vaguely related to the real conflict between the parties. 
The study also indicates the necessity for courts to fashion relief 
in a manner calculated to encourage direct, personal participa-
tion by those individuals involved in implementing the remedial 
plan. 
I. THE ANN ARBOR BLACK ENGLISH CASE 
In Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. 
Ann Arbor School District Board, u presiding Judge Charles 
Joiner confronted what he fully recognized to be social reform 
13. 473 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1979). Earlier opinions in the case are at Martin 
Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 
1324 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (dismissing portions of the complaint), and Martin Luther King 
Junior Elementary School Children v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 463 F. Supp. 1027 (E.D. 
Mich. 1978) (conditionally dismissing amended complaint). 
14. 473 F. Supp. 1371. 
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litigation having potentially national impact. Plaintiffs, children 
enrolled in the Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School in 
Ann Arbor, had advanced arguments raising "one of the most 
important and pervasive problems facing modern urban 
America-the problem of why 'Johnnie Can't Read' when John-
nie is black and comes from a scatter low income housing unit 
. . . in an upper middle class area of one of America's most lib-
eral and forward-looking cities."16 Finding black English to be a 
recognized language system different in many respects from 
standard English,16 Judge Joiner concluded that the failure of 
the defendant Ann Arbor school system to take specific action to 
overcome the language difficulties facing the plaintiff black-En-
glish-speaking children constituted a denial of their rights under 
the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974.17 
Teachers in the Ann Arbor sch~ol system had not been 
trained either to recognize the rules of black English or to teach 
children to "code switch"18 from black to standard English; this 
deficiency in training, the court felt, might have caused teachers 
to consider black English as incorrect, ungrammatical, and erro-
neous-and to perceive students using the dialect as inferior.19 
At the very least, the court concluded, the teachers' lack of 
15. Id. at 1381; see id. at 1373 ("This action is a cry for judicial help in opening the 
doors to the establishment. Plaintiffs' counsel says that it is an action to keep another 
generation from becoming functionally illiterate."). 
16. Id. at 1382. "Standard" English refers to "that form of English used by relatively 
well-educated, middle-class Americans . . . [and] is considered to be standard simply 
because of its widespread use." van Geel, The Right to be Taught Standard English: 
Exploring the Implications of Lau v. Nichols for Black Americans, 25 SYRACUSE L. REv. 
863, 863 n.2 (1974). Black English is one of many English dialects. See J. FALK, LINGUIS-
TICS AND LANGUAGE 287 (1978). 
The King court relied heavily upon the conclusions of expert linguists that black En-
glish represents a cohesive language system with definite rules of grammar, syntax, and 
pronunciation used primarily by black Americans in informal communications. 473 F. 
Supp. at 1375-76. See generally R. BURLING, ENGLISH IN BLACK AND WHITE (1973); J. 
DILLARD, BLACK ENGLISH (1972); E. FoLB, RUNNIN' DowN SoME LINES: THE LANGUAGE 
AND CULTURE OF BLACK TEENAGERS (1980); G. SMITHERMAN, TALKIN AND TEsTJFYJN 
(1977). Indeed, the court found that the plaintiffs spoke black English at home and in 
their community, although they could speak and understand standard English and usu-
ally did so in school. 473 F. Supp. at 1379. 
17. The Act provides in part: "No State shall deny equal educational opportunity to 
an individual on account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by- ... (0 the 
failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome language bani-
ers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional programs." 20 
u.s.c. § 1703(0 (1976). 
18. "Code switching" denotes the interpretive process employed when black-English-
speaking children shift to the use of standard English. In effect, black-English-speaking 
children can become bilingual, using their dialect at home and in their community while 
becoming fluent in standard English as well. See 473 F. Supp. at 1376. 
19. Id. at 1377. 
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knowledge and expertise would hamper even sincere efforts to 
teach black-English-speaking children to read.9° Therefore, the 
court determined that a "language barrier" existed, impeding 
equal educational participation for black-English-speaking chil-
dren. st Although the defendant school system had no intent or 
purpose to discriminate against black children, its failure to pur-
sue special steps for dealing with the black English problem 
"impact[ed] on race,"11 in violation of the federal statute.18 To 
remedy the school system's failure to address the special needs 
of black-English-speaking students, Judge Joiner ordered that 
the Ann Arbor School Board adopt measures that (1) would ed-
ucate its teachers regarding black English, and (2) would en-
hance the teaching of reading to black-English-speaking children 
at the King School. 94 
A. Evolution of the Lawsuit 
Judge Joiner had thus embarked upon a novel course111 
designed to address educational difficulties confronting black-
English-speaking children. Seemingly, social reform through liti-
gation had succeeded; the plaintiffs had secured redress through 
the courts for their grievances about public school policy.116 Yet a 
very different picture of the lawsuit emerges upon examination 
of the forces-often more complex than the case would indi-
cate-that initially induced the plaintiffs to seek recourse 
through the courts. Indeed, the incidents and concerns that 
20. Id. at 1379. 
21. Id. at 1375-76. The court noted that this language barrier may engender even 
greater discrimination than that faced by the monolingual foreign child, because foreign 
languages are not stigmatized as inferior. Id. at 1376. 
22. Id. at 1382. 
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1976); see supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
24. 473 F. Supp. at 1383-84. For discussions focusing upon the court's finding of legal 
liability, see Comment, Judicial Recognition of Black English as a Language Barrier 
Under the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 65 IowA L. REV. 1445 (1980); Note, 
Black English and Equal Educational Opportunity, 79 MICH. L. REV. 279 (1980); Case-
note, Constitutional Law-Equal Educational Opportunity-Failure to Consider Black 
English in Reading Instruction, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 1091 (1980); Comment, Martin Lu-
ther King Junior Elementary School Children v. Michigan Board of Education: Exten-
sion of EEOA Protection to Black-English-Speaking Students, 22 WM. & MARv L. REv. 
161 (1980). 
25. See Note, Black English and Equal Educational Opportunity, supra note 24, at 
297-98 (arguing that the significance of Judge Joiner's opinion "lies not in the remedy 
the court ordered, but in the nature of the language barrier it recognized"). 
26. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 
1281, 1302 (1976) (social reform litigation addresses "grievance[s) about the operation of 
public policy"). 
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sparked a lawsuit and led eventually to the decree in King bore 
little or no relation to the school system's approach toward black 
English. 
1. The Green Road Housing Project and the King School-
The Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School is located in 
a relatively affluent, predominantly white neighborhood of Ann 
Arbor, Michigan.17 An academic and professional community, 
home of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor boasts a high 
concentration of intellectually gifted children and an excellent 
public school system. 
With an eye toward avoiding racial or economic segregation, 
Ann Arbor has built low-income, subsidized housing in small 
units scattered throughout various parts of the city. Children 
from one of these developments, the Green Road Housing Pro-
ject, attend the King School. The friction between the Green 
Road parents and children, almost all of whom are black and 
low-income,H and the white, middle-class-oriented King School 
created the initial discontent that was eventually molded into 
the King litigation.99 
27. 473 F. Supp. 1374, 1381. 
28. Complaint at 10, Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. Ann 
Arbor School Dist. Bd., 473 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1979). 
29. Two stories typify the relations between the King School and the Green Road 
families. The first concerns transportation for the Green Road schoolchildren. The hous• 
ing project lies 1.2 miles from the school, just under the 1.5 mile radius that makes chil-
dren eligible for bussing. The mothers felt this to be too long a walk for younger chil-
dren, and demanded a bus. Meanwhile, the school was receiving complaints from 
residents of the modem, affluent white neighborhood surrounding the King School about 
Green Road children "cutting through" yards. The school district responded to this pres-
sure by providing a bus financed by Human Relations funds. 
When children began misbehaving on the bus, the school held one meeting with Green 
Road families to discuss this problem; no mechanism for continued parental involvement 
was developed. After an incident between Green Road children and an aide who super-
vised the children while they waited for the bus, angry Green Road parents and an attor-
ney arrived at the school and confronted the principal. The school called the police and 
had the parents removed; subsequently, funds for the bus evaporated. 
The provision of lunches for the Green Road children provides a second example of 
the tensions existing between the housing project and the school. The Green Road chil-
dren had to stay at school during lunch because they lived too far away to walk home 
and back during the allotted time. Yet they often arrived at school without any lunch, 
and King School, with its small proportion of low-income students, did not qualify for 
federal funds and thus had no lunch program. Id. at 9, 12. To resolve the problem, the 
Parent-Teacher Organization ("PTO") eventually agreed to provide peanut butter and 
jelly sandwiches. Unwilling to let the children make their own sandwiches, however, the 
PTO prepared and froze the food. Often the sandwiches were not taken out of the 
freezer before lunch, though, so the children ate frozen sandwiches. (These stories, and 
much of the background information about the litigation, were obtained from interviews 
with Ruth Zweifter of the Student Advocacy Center, three out of four of the plaintiff's' 
mothers, and several of the plaintiff' schoolchildren.) 
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The children from the Green Road Project felt they were per-
ceived by their teachers and classmates as a group-"the Green 
Road kids"-rather than as individuals. They felt the teachers 
consistently blamed them for trouble they did not cause and 
kept them under constant scrutiny. According to the Green 
Road children, behavior tolerated in others resulted in discipline 
for them. Likewise, the Green Road parents felt the school to be 
"closed" to them-that it resisted rather than sought their in-
volvement, and that it perceived their complaints as attacks to 
be repulsed. 
Aside from the sense that their participation in the school had 
been rejected, the Green Road parents were concerned with the 
apparent failure of their children to advance and learn in school. 
Their children were labelled "learning disabled" or "emotionally 
impaired," and so received special help, 80 but still seemed not to 
be learning. 81 The parents felt their children had normal intelli-
gence for their socioeconomic group and considered the labels 
affixed by the school to be stigmatizing and misleading. The 
school administration appeared to refuse responsibility for this 
slow progess, and blamed the children and parents for the prob-
lem. The parents felt distant and uninformed, unable to obtain 
satisfactory answers about their children's difficulties. 
2. Translation of the grievances into a lawsuit-From this at-
mosphere of alienation and disaffection grew a landmark legal 
ruling on the· almost unrelated subject of a "language barrier" 
under the Equal Educational Opportunities Act. The catalyst for 
this conversion was Ruth Zweifler of the Student Advocacy 
Center, an Ann Arbor organization devoted to advancing 
students' interests in the schools. Zweifler became heavily in-
volved with the problems of the Green Road children, represent-
ing them at meetings of the Educational Planning and Place-
ment Committee, which determined whether students were 
learning disabled or emotionally impaired. 81 She argued that the 
30. Michigan law requires school systems to give appropriate special help to children 
determined by an Educational Planning and Placement Committee to be "handicapped." 
Two categories of "handicapped" children are "learning disabled" and "emotionally im-
paired." MICH. AnMIN. Coos R. 340.1702, .1703, .1721 (1979). See generally Abrams & 
Abrams, Legal Obligations Toward the Post-Secondary Learning Disabled Student, 27 
WAYNE L. R.Ev. 1475 (1981). 
31. 473 F. Supp. at 1380. 
32. Children experiencing learning difficulties are usually referred by their teachers 
to the District Special Services Department for a comprehensive evaluation. Following 
the evaluation, an Educational Planning and Placement Committee meeting is held to 
recommend a course of action. Regulations promulgated by the State Department of Ed-
ucation, M1cH. AnMIN. CoDB R. 340.1701(4) (1979), require that a representative of the 
administration, instructional personnel, diagnostic personnel, and the parents of the 
196 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 15:2 
problems of the Green Road children were not individual but 
socioeconomic, concluding that the situation demanded solutions 
more generalized than affixing labels to individual children in 
order to make special help available. 
During the summer of 1977, a series of meetings were held 
among Zweifler, attorneys Gabe Kaimowitz and Ken Lewis of 
Michigan Legal Services,88 and the Green Road parents and chil-
dren. 84 The parents sought a change not only in the school's be-
havior, but, more importantly, in its attitude. They wanted their 
children to be respected by the school as individuals rather than 
being condemned as a group. They wanted their participation in 
the school to be welcomed rather than rejected. They wanted 
the school to accept its responsibility to find an effective way to 
teach their children. 
Litigation was adopted as a strategy for redressing these griev-
ances of the Green Road families. In retrospect, suing the school 
seems the least effective means for improving the attitude of 
teachers and administrators. Options other than litigation, how-
ever, were not pressed by the advisors from Michigan Legal Ser-
vices and the Student Advocacy Center-perhaps in part be-
cause these advisors had their own interests in pursuing 
litigation. The Student Advocacy Center desired legitimacy in 
the eyes of the parents, the school system, and the public as an 
organization willing to provide powerful advocacy for systemic 
change; the publicity generated by a federal lawsuit would ad-
vance its social reform objectives. 811 The lawyers also sought pub-
child all be in attendance at the Educational Planning and Placement Committee 
meeting. 
33. The initial connection between the Green Road children and Michigan Legal Ser-
vices lawyers occurred at the behest of the Student Advocacy Center. Ruth Zweifler ar-
ranged for Gabe Kaimowitz of Michigan Legal Services to represent the Green Road 
parents in a dispute that arose when certain Green Road children were denied their 
request to transfer from King School to nearby Northaide Elementary School. The meet-
ing between school administrators and parents protesting the denial was unproductive, 
indeed hostile, but the contact with legal counsel had been made. 
This mirrored a pattern seen commonly in litigation seeking institutional change. 
From small welfare rights or prisoners organizations, for example, to the pervasive 
ACLU or NAACP, social reform organizations often constitute the vehicle that brings 
lawyers together with individuals who allege a deprivation of their rights. 
34. Information about the lawyers' involvement was obtained not only from the inter-
views listed in note 29 supra, but also from interviews with attorneys Ken Lewis of 
Michigan Legal Services, counsel for plaintiffs, and John Weaver of Butzel, Long, Gust, 
Klein, and Van Zile, counsel for defendants. Additional information was obtained from 
an interview with United States District Judge Charles Joiner. 
35. Unquestionably, the Student Advocacy Center perceived itself as advancing the 
interests of the Green Road families as well as its own objectives. Nonetheless, the 
Center, in common with other social reform organizations, manifested substantial insti-
tutional interests in legitimacy and power. See Bell, supra note 10; Halpern & Cunning-
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licity, not only for their office, but more importantly, to expose 
the failure of middle-class-oriented public education to deal with 
the problems of poor black children. 88 Subtle negotiation and 
low-key persuasion, though effective in individual cases, do not 
generate publicity to the same extent as federal public-interest 
litigation-publicity that could induce social reforms extending 
beyond the individual case: 
Translating the parents' concerns and goals into legal claims 
was a formidable task. The lawyers could not argue that inade-
quacies in the education of Green Road children resulted from 
racial discrimination alone; a substantial number of middle-class 
black children attended King School without encountering the 
difficulties experienced by the Green Road families. The lawyers 
concluded that the obstacles confronting the Green Road chil-
dren stemmed from economic, social, and cultural factors: these 
children lived in a family and neighborhood structure that was 
poor and black. 
3. Formulation of the complaint-The Michigan Legal Ser-
vices lawyers settled upon a complaint stating six claims for re-
lief. The first two causes of action, alleging· due process and 
equal protection violations, focused on the need to provide spe-
cial services for the Green Road schoolchildren without misla-
beling them as emotionally impaired or learning disabled. 87 
These claims came closest to the expressed concerns of the 
Green Road families, and represented the major thrust of the 
lawsuit. 
Yet the complaint also included four other claims that moved 
farther and farther from the clients' concerns and goals. Only 
the third cause of action-alleging that the King School had 
ham, Reflections on the New Public Interest Law: Theory and Practice at the Center 
for Law and Social Policy, 59 GEO. L.J. 1095 (1971); Hegland, Beyond Enthusiasm and 
Commitment, 13 AR1z. L. REv. 805 (1971). 
36. Social reform lawyers such as Kaimowitz and Lewis of Michigan Legal Services 
are willing to accept lower ealaries and less prestigious jobs than many attorneys, usually 
because of their commitment to work for social change. They commonly approach litiga-
tion in terms of goals, not clients; indeed, social reform lawyers often perceive the litiga-
tion as their own. See generally Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Con-
fronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REv. 337 (1978); 
Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069 (1970). Clients_ fre-
quently serve as vehicles for bringing the suit, satisfying the technical requirements of 
article III, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, and enabling the pursuit of reform objectives. In 
King, while the lawyers sincerely felt that they were serving the best interests of their 
clients, they unquestionably viewed the clients' concerns based upon their own interests, 
and thus focused on the group harm and the social reform solution rather than on any 
individual relief. 
37. See Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. Michigan Bd. of 
Educ., 451 F. Supp. 1324, 1327-30 (E.D. Mich. 1978). 
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failed to take account of the special educational needs of black-
English-speaking children38-was vindicated ultimately by the 
court:-39 The fourth claim presented in the complaint alleged ra-
cial discrimination: plaintiffs had been deprived of special fed-
eral programs aimed at assisting the education of the poor, be-
cause the King School did not have a sufficient number of poor 
children enrolled to qualify for federal funds.'0 The fifth cause 
of action was a pendent state-law claim, urging that the Green 
Road children had been denied their right to a free education, 
guaranteed by the Michigan constitution,41 because they were 
not supplied educational materials available in the homes of 
their classmates.42 Finally, the complaint sought damages for 
deprivation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights by various named 
members of the school administration.'3 
The complaint resulted entirely from decisions made by the 
lawyers alone. They selected the claims that would be asserted 
and elected to press all six causes of action in the hope that at 
least "one would catch." The Green Road parents were not con-
sulted on these tactical choices," even though arguably the addi-
tion of counts three through six detracted from the legitimacy of 
the two causes of action that most clearly stated their griev-
ances. The expanded scope of the complaint perhaps provided 
an avenue for the court to ignore potentially mor~ vexing claims 
38. See id. at 1330-33. 
39. See Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. Ann Arbor School 
Dist. Bd., 473 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1979). 
40. See 451 F. Supp. at 1333. 
41. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
42. See 451 F. Supp. at 1333-34. 
43. See id. at 1334. 
44. Similarly, the Green Road families were not consulted about various procedural 
matters in the complaint. The lawyers reached a unilateral decision to file the case as a 
class action, and to include the Student Advocacy Center as "next friend" along with the 
mothers of the plaintiff schoolchildren. Both these procedural tactics can best be under-
stood from the institutional standpoints of the advisory groups, rather than as a response 
to the needs of the plaintiffs. Like many public interest litigators, the Michigan Legal 
Services lawyers routinely approach social reform cases as class actions; their orientation 
is to view individual grievances as stemming from systemic problems. Including the Stu-
dent Advocacy Center as next friend helped to serve the interests of the Center in ob-
taining publicity and legitimacy. 
Neither procedural tactic bore ultimately on the merits; Judge Joiner refused to certify 
the case as a class action, 451 F. Supp. at 1326, and dismissed the Student Advocacy 
Center as next friend, id. at 1335. Nonetheless, the lawyers' broader view of the problem 
prevailed: the court-ordered remedy required change in the entire approach of the King 
School toward all black-English-speaking children, rather than providing only the plain-
tiffs with relief. See infra pt. IC. More importantly, it seems clear that both procedural 
tactics had potential to detract from the apparent legitimacy of the plaintiffs' grievances, 
and certainly detracted from the main thrust of the complaint. 
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and issues without denying relief entirely, and, at the very least, 
diverted the energy of the lawyers and the attention of the co\lrt 
away from the most pressing concerns of the Green Road fami-
lies. 
B. Adjudication of the Dispute 
From the beginning, a pattern· of communication developed 
that may very well have affected the decisions and litigation 
positions taken by the defendant Ann Arbor School Board. At-
torney John Weaver worked closely with the Superintendent of 
Schools, Harry Howard, in developing strategy-sometimes 
making decisions that Howard later approved, other times act-
ing jointly with Howard. Oftentimes, Howard appeared to have 
authority to proceed without obtaining Board approval. Further-
more, even when the Board was more closely involved, it re-
ceived its information in distilled form from Weaver and How-
ard, who sought ratification for tentative choices already made. 
With the exception of the decision not to appeal the trial court 
ruling, 46 the Board, not surprisingly, acquiesced in the course 
charted by Howard and Weaver. Thus, Howard and Weaver rec-
ommended opposing the lawsuit on the merits rather than nego-
tiating a settlement, and the Board concurred.'6 
After denying preliminary injunctive relief and refusing to cer-
tify the case as a class action,n Judge Joiner acted on several of 
the defendant School Board's substantive challenges to the com-
plaint. He dismissed all plaintiffs' claims, with the exception of 
the black English cause of action. 48 Moreover, he dismissed the 
45. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
46. One might have expected the liberally-minded, excellent Ann Arbor school sys-
tem to be responsive to the plaintiffs' request for solutions to a serious educational prob-
lem. Indeed, many members of the system-teachers, administrators, and School Board 
members-were sympathetic to the plaintiffs and would have preferred negotiation to 
defending on the merits. See infra Table C. Because the complaint came accompanied 
by a federal lawsuit, however, and included accusations of illegal conduct, most individu-
als within the defendant entity wanted to defend; thus, the minority position was 
suppressed. 
47. 451 F. Supp. at 1326. 
48. The first two claims alleged a deprivation of the schoolchildren's rights as pro-
tected by federal statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) (1976), and a violation of their 
equal protection rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1. The court, in rejecting these claims, distilled plaintiffs' theories into two com-
ponents. First, plaintiffs were arguing a deprivation of the right to equal educational 
opportunity. But, as the court observed, the Supreme Court previously had held educa-
tion not to be a fundamental right. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1 (1972). Therefore, in order to establish their equal protection argument, plain-
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Student Advocacy Center as "next friend" of the plaintiffs, rec-
ognizing the potential conflict of interest between the mothers 
and the Center in pressing the best interests of the schoolchil-
dren. 49 Thus, all that remained of the original lawsuit was an 
individual action by fifteen children,110 through their mothers, al-
leging that the Ann Arbor School Board's failure to take their 
black English "language barrier" into account in teaching them 
to read denied them equal educational opportunity. The major 
thrust of the suit had been turned aside. 
The plaintiffs confronted a difficult choice: they could concen-
trate upon appealing the dismissal of their major causes of ac-
tion, or could continue the litigation of the black English claim. 
Choices of goals and strategy for plaintiffs111 were influenced by a 
tiffs had to demonstrate that the school system's decision not to provide remedial ser-
vices to all arguably needy children bore no rational relationship to a legitimate state 
objective. Plaintiffs had not satisfied this difficult standard. 451 F. Supp. at 1327-28. 
The second prong of the equal protection argument involved plaintiffs' argument that 
they were being stigmatized by being labeled as handicapped. Again, the court applied a 
rational relationship standard in upholding the school policy, because plaintiffs did not 
establish themselves as a suspect class. Id. at 1328. 
After denying defendants' motion to dismiss the claim relating to black English, see id. · 
at 1330-32, the court considered plaintiffs' fourth cause of action, which alleged a depri-
vation of federal benefits because an insufficient number of disadvantaged children at-
tended the King School. The court concluded that a denial of benefits on this basis fell 
outside the scope of the federal statute forbidding discrimination in the administration 
of federal programs, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976); thus, the allegation was facially insuffi-
cient to state a claim for relief. 451 F. Supp. at 1333. 
The fifth claim advanced by the plaintiffs involved a pendent state-law claim that the 
King School had violated their right to a free education, as guaranteed both by state 
statute, M.C.L. § 380.1147(1) (1979), and by the Michigan Constitution, MICH. CONST. 
art. 8, § 2. The court dismissed this claim after recognizing that the Michigan equal 
protection provisions were intended to secure rights identical to those protected under 
the federal constitution and statutes, concluding that the Michigan courts would not 
likely be sympathetic to the claim advanced by the plaintiffs. 451 F. Supp. at 1334. 
Finally, the court dismissed the sixth element of the plaintiffs' complaint, which al-
leged tortious violations of their constitutional rights by named defendants. Because all 
plaintiffs' constitutional arguments had been dismissed, any causes of action against spe-
cific officials for constitutional deprivations had clearly been eviscerated. Id. at 1334. 
49. 451 F. Supp. at 1334-35. The court noted, however, that the Student Advocacy 
Center remained free to serve the plaintiffs in an advisory capacity. Id. at 1335. 
50. The plaintiff groups decreased from 15 to 11 children during the course of the 
lawsuit, because 4 children moved out of the school district. 473 F. Supp. at 1373. 
51. The theory underlying the advocacy system dictates that the attorney act as a 
neutral conduit to the court for the expressed views of the client. Thus, the attorney has 
no independent interest in the case; he must abide by the client's decisions regarding the 
appropriate course of action. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY Canons 
5, 7 (1979). But an attorney often cannot realistically carry out this theoretical responsi-
bility in a social reform case involving complex parties. See Special Project, The Reme-
dial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 784, 885-86 (1978) 
[hereinafter cited as Project, Institutional Reform]. The advocate pursuing a social re-
form agenda may have interests different from the individuals being represented. See, 
e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978); Gonzales v. 
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pattern of decisionmaking-mirroring the defendant's communi-
cations network-which had evolved among the various indi-
viduals in the plaintiffs' camp. Lawyers Kaimowitz and Lewis 
reached tentative decisions either by themselves or in tandem 
with Ruth Zweifler of the Student Advocacy Center. 112 Zweifler 
commonly presented these choices to the mothers, and some-
times the children, while at the same time presenting the advi-
sors' views on the political and legal likelihood of success. The 
clients uniformly accepted the advice of their lawyers, friends, 
and allies.113 · 
As a practical matter, therefore, Kaimowitz and Lewis were 
responsible for the choice between appealing the dismissal and 
pursuing the remaining claim. After consultation with linguistics 
experts,114 the lawyers concluded that the black English claim, if 
vindicated on the merits, could realize the objectives originally 
envisioned by the lawsuit. The King School would be forced to 
confront the socioeconomic differences between black-English-
speaking children and its other students, and to devise a plan 
for providing these children with more effective instruction. 
Moreover, winning the lawsuit, under any theory, was important 
for publicity purposes: the school would be exposed publicly for 
its failures in meeting the particular needs of poor black chil-
dren. The lawyers determined that litigation of the sole remain-
ing claim should continue; the Student Advocacy Center agreed, 
as did the Green Road parents. 
Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973). Furthermore, there may be vastly varying percep-
tions regarding the best interests of the group seeking social change. See Y eazell, From 
Group Litigation to Class Action, Part II: Interest, Class, and Representation, 27 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1067, 1112-14 (1980). 
A single lawyer cannot simply channel a multifaceted interest array into a consistent 
litigation posture. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 21. To avoid equivocal advocacy, the lawyer 
must select a single position to present to the court; dissenting viewpoints within the 
complex party must be suppressed. Indeed, equivocal advocacy in response to a multi-
tude of interests might violate the lawyer's obligation to represent a client zealously. See 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7. See generally Bell, supra note 
10, at 493-505 (discussing the ethical problems arising in civil rights litigation). 
52. Kaimowitz and Lewis had a natural affinity with Zwiefler. All three were involved 
in seeking systemic change, and had similar educational and social backgrounds. The 
Green Road families, in contrast, were interested mainly in their specific problems, not 
social reform, and differed from the lawyers both educationally and socially. Quite natu-
rally, therefore, and quite typically, the Michigan Legal Services lawyers went first to the 
Student Advocacy Center before consulting with the plaintiffs. 
53. Cf. Bell, supra note 10, at 477 n.21 (After receiving a "detailed exposition" from 
civil rights lawyers regarding the possibilities for a school desegregation suit, "it was 
hardly surprising that the black parents did not reject [the advice]. To put it kindly, 
they had not been exposed to an adversary discussion on the subject."). 
54. The expert primarily involved was Dr. Geneva Smitherman, a linguistics profes-
sor at Wayne State University. 
202 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 15:2 
A well-publicized trial ensued in the summer of 1979.116 Plain-
tiffs presented extensive testimony from linguistics experts, as 
well as from many of the Green Road parents and children, in 
addition to calling the principal and several teachers from the 
King School as adverse witnesses. John Weaver, counsel for the 
defendants, felt certain that the plaintifffs had failed to estab-
lish a legally sufficient case; should the district court find for the 
plaintiffs, he was confident that he could obtain a reversal on 
appeal. Furthermore, through cross-examination of the King 
School teachers and principal, Weaver felt he had established 
much of the School Board's defense. To emphasize his conten-
tion that the plaintiffs' case was inadequate, Weaver elected to 
rest without calling any witnesses. Superintendent Howard and 
the Board went along with their lawyer's choice. 
Following Judge Joiner's finding for the plaintiffs on the black 
English claim, 116 however, Weaver's strategy suffered a fatal set-
back. An intervening election had altered the composition of the 
Ann Arbor School Board; the majority that favored fighting the 
litigation had dissolved. When Weaver sought approval of his 
decision to appeal the ruling, the School Board opted, for the 
first time, to reject the choice of its advisors117 and accept the 
judgment of the district court that the Ann Arbor school system 
had abridged the rights of black-English-speaking children at 
the King School. 
C. The Remedial Plan 
Following the pattern seen frequently in social reform litiga-
55. See, e.g., Outcry over •"Wu/ Tickets", TIME, Aug. 20, 1979, at 61; Black English 
Gets Its Day in Court, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 9, 1979, at 42; N.Y. Times, July 
13, 1979, at AS, col. 1; id., Aug. 21, 1979, at Cl, col. 1. 
56. See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text. 
57. The events contributing to this decision not to appeal illustrate how advisors, by 
controlling the information used to evaluate their recommended decision, effectively con-
trol the outcome-a phenomenon particularly common among complex parties in social 
reform litigation. In executive session, acting upon the advice of Superintendent Howard 
and attorney Weaver, the School Board initially voted, by a slim 5-4 majority, in favor of 
appealing the district court ruling. Both advisors had significant incentives to seek an 
appeal; Howard likely perceived the district court holding as an indictment of his admin-
istration, while Weaver needed vindication of his decision to rest at trial without 
presenting a case-in-chief. The Board concluded subsequently, however, that it was le-
gally required by Michigan's Open Meetings Act, M.C.L. §§ 15.261-.275 (1979), to take 
this vote at a public meeting. In the ensuing public session, persons sympathetic to the 
cause of the Green Road families, including plaintiffs' counsel, addressed the Board. Af-
ter considering the information and arguments from another perspective, a single mem-
ber changed sides, and the Board voted not to appeal the decision. 
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tion,'18 Judge Joiner ordered the defendant Ann Arbor School 
Board to submit its own plan devising relief for black-English-
speaking children in the King School. 119 The plan submitted to 
the court by the Board, 80 actually developed by the school sys-
tem administration, required King School teachers to receive 
twenty hours of formal instruction in black English, centered es-
pecially upon the problems involved in teaching reading to 
black-English-speaking children. Furthermore, the plan made 
provision for three or four follow-up seminars during the semes-
ter that would address application of the formal black English 
instruction to classroom situations. 61 
Plaintiffs objected to several features of the plan, primarily re-
garding the exclusion of the mothers and the Michigan Legal 
Services lawyers from any role in monitoring the plan's imple-
mentation. The court rejected changes suggested by the plain-
tiffs,82 however, declining to alter the School Board's proposal 
because it was "rational in light of existing knowledge."88 Thus, 
with the exception of a minor modification requiring that there 
be attempts to evaluate the success of the relief by assessing the 
improvement in the children's reading skills," the court ap~ 
58. See Chayes, supra note 26, at 1298 n.80 ("Often the court will ask the defendants 
to help draft the initial decree since they may be the only persons who can combine the 
needed technical background and detailed knowledge of the institution to be changed."). 
59. 473 F. Supp. at 1383. 
60. Id. at 1383-91. 
61. Id. at 1385 n.1. 
62. See Response on Behalf of Plaintiff's to an Educational Plan Submitted by Ann 
Arbor Board Evaluation [sic], Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. 
Ann Arbor School Dist. Bd., 473 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1979); see also 473 F. Supp. 
at 1389. 
63. 473 F. Supp. at 1389. 
64. See id. at 1390. When it came time for the School Board to submit its report on 
the implementation of the court-ordered relief, attorney Weaver and Superintendent 
Howard apparently were determined to avoid the vagaries of the Board. Cf. supra note 
57 (describing the Board's refusal to ratify the decision to appeal made by Weaver and 
Howard). They had prepared a report which served their interests: it found that the 
remedial plan had been implemented "in a good faith manner," Final Evaluation, King 
Elementary School Vernacular Black English Inservice Program, Summary of the Re-
port, at 1 (1980) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform), and that it "reinforced and 
expanded generally existing teacher understanding and teaching strategies relative to the 
issues surrounding black vernacular English and [the problems of) learning to read in 
school," id. at 2. In other words, the program's effect had been only minimal-because 
the teachers already knew the problems and had solutions. This finding, of course, di-
rectly challenged the district court's conclusion that the King School had not addressed 
the problems of black-English-speaking schoolchildren; in effect, the school system had 
exonerated itself. 
By agreement of Weaver and Howard, the report was to be filed without approval or 
input from the School Board. Some Board members were shocked that an evaluation 
report would be provided to the court without their knowledge or consent-particularly 
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proved the School Board's plan and ordered it into effect.611 
II. RESISTANCE TO THE COURT-ORDERED REMEDY: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY 
Social reform litigation often envisions restructuring a portion 
of society by inducing a change in bureaucratic behavior.66 In 
King, for instance, the plaintiffs desired institutional change, 
seeking to readjust both the policies and attitudes of a public 
school administration.67 
Yet such restructuring cannot be coerced by judicial fiat; the 
courts stand powerless to effect systemic change without a 
bureaucracy's voluntary compliance. For this reason, among 
others,68 a defendant bureaucracy adjudged liable on the merits 
often will be entrusted with primary responsibility for develop-
ing a remedial plan. This approach, designed to minimize judi-
cial intrusiveness while ensuring that the bureaucracy has a 
stake in the success of the plan it has created, 69 nevertheless 
may not eliminate resistance to court-ordered relief. Of neces-
sity, in a bureaucracy composed of varying interests,70 only the 
top administrators are likely to be intimately involved in formu-
lating a remedial plan. 71 Therefore, those most directly affected 
by the remedy, and most involved in carrying it out-the lower 
levels of bureaucracies-are distanced from the litigation. This 
may well lead these individuals to resist the judicial decree, and 
certainly reduces their stake in the plan's success.79 Because 
because the Board, not the Superintendent, was the party defendant. Perhaps the Board 
might have ordered additional study of the remedial program, or altered the language of 
the report. But another election had occurred since the decision not to appeal the trial 
court ruling, see supra note 57 and accompanying text, and the majority sympathetic to 
the plaintiffs had evaporated; the Board majority overrode the concerns of the minority 
group and agreed to the decision reached by Weaver and Howard to file the report with 
the court before showing it to the Board. 
65. 473 F. Supp. at 1390-91. 
66. See Chayes, supra note 26, at 1298-1301; Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and 
the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 467-68 (1980); 
Yeazell, Intervention and the Idea of Litigation: A Commentary on the Los Angeles 
School Case, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 244, 258 (1977). See generally Project, Institutional 
Reform, supra note 51, at 813-14. 
67. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35. 
68. See supra note 58. 
69. See Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 428, 437-40 (1977). 
70. See Yeazell, supra note 51, at 1112-14. 
71. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
72. See Yeazell, supra note 66, at 256-60. 
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these actors are critical to the implementation of a remedial 
plan, their disaffection with the process and consequent resis-
tance to court-ordered remedies should be of vital concern to 
those who perceive the courts as vehicles for social reform.78 
A. Overview of the Study 
A consideration of the specific responses to the relief ordered 
in King may yield valuable insights into the general problem of 
bureaucratic opposition to judicially mandated changes in insti-
tutional behavior. Toward this end, I undertook a survey of the 
perceptions of the defendant group in King," with special em-
phasis upon the King School teachers, the group most responsi-
ble for effectuating-and .most able to vitiate-the court's reme-
dial plan. 
The survey hypothesized that individuals within the bureau-
cracy resist court-ordered relief under two circumstances: when 
73. There are many who question whether courts should be involved in social reform. 
See, e.g., Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Forward: On Discovering Fundamental 
Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978); Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). Others find social reform litigation to be justified by historical 
considerations and political necessity. See, e.g., Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 
1963); United States v. Michigan, 460 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Eisenberg & 
Yeazell, supra note 66; Fiss, supra note l; Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 
YALE L.J. 681 (1979); Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action, Part I: The In-
dustrialization of Group Litigation, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 514 (1980); Yeazell, supra note 
51; Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action, 
77 CoLUM. L. REv. 866 (1977). This Article does not enter that debate, but simply as-
sumes that courts will continue their involvement in broad social reform questions, and 
so offers suggestions for improvements in the process. 
74. In the fall of 1980, nearly a year after the King School teachers had received their 
special instruction in black English, see supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text, ques-
tionnaires were mailed to each of the 56 individual members of the defendant entity who 
could be identified. These consisted of 14 School Board members who had served at 
some time during the 3 years the suit was pending, 6 school system administrators who 
were involved significantly in the case, the principal and 34 staff members and teachers 
of the King School, and a representative of the teachers' union who had been active in 
the case. Fifty of the 56 questionnaires were delivered; of those, 25 were completed and 
returned, for an overall 50% return rate. The principal, the teachers' union representa-
tive, and all 5 administrators responded to their questionnaires. Half of the 12 question-
naires delivered to School Board members were returned, but only 39% (12 of 31) of the 
teachers who received questionnaires responded. 
Based on discussions with teachers and others connected with the case, I suspect the 
low teacher-response rate reflects in large part their bitterness over the situation. They 
felt wrongfully accused by the plaintiffs and betrayed by the administrators and the 
School Board. Rather than reflecting apathy, therefore, the low response rate among the 
teachers likely indicates even deeper dissatisfaction than shown in the actual responses. 
See infra Table A and accompanying text. 
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they perceive the judicial process to be illegitimate or unfair,711 
and when they disagree with the substantive result in the case.76 
The judicial process could certainly eliminate resistance to its 
remedies by finding for the defendant bureaucracy on the mer-
its; there would be no bureaucratic opposition without an in-
junction. Quite clearly, however, the system cannot abdicate its 
responsibility to protect individuals from illegal conduct.77 Em-
phasis must be placed, therefore, upon minimizing bureaucratic 
resistance without regard to outcome. Underlying this approach 
is the belief that people will be more likely to adhere to a result, 
even if unfavorable to them, when they perceive the legal pro-
cess as procedurally fair. 78 
Thus, the survey attempted to identify the sources of 
perceived procedural unfairness that might have fostered resis-
tance to the court's order in King. From the analysis of the liti-
gation process based upon interviews with the participants, 
questions regarding interest representation appeared to be cru-
cial. To the extent the defendant group in general, and the 
teachers in particular, felt their own interests - or indeed, those 
of others-were not represented adequately in the judicial pro-
cess, presumably they would be less likely to obey a court order 
with which they disagreed. 
B. Presentation of Findings 
As a threshold matter, the survey inquired into the extent of 
75. See Chayes, supra note 26, at 1299; Walker, Lind & Thibaut, The Relation Be· 
tween Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L. R.Ev. 1401, 1415-16 (1979); Yeazell, 
supra note 66, at 257-58. 
76. Indeed, much of the scholarly criticism of judicial involvement in social reform 
can be traced to this same source. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 66, at 514-15. 
77. See United States v. Michigan, 460 F. Supp. 637,639 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Higgen-
botham, The Priority of Human Rights in Court Reform, 70 F.R.D. 134, 138 (1976); 
Neuborne, supra note 7, at 1127-28; Satter, Changing Roles of Courts and Legislatures, 
11 CONN. L. REV. 230, 240-46 (1979). 
78. This assumption draws support from an earli'er study on the public perception of 
legal institutions. See Engstrom & Giles, Expectations and Images: A Note on Diffuse 
Support for Legal Institutions, 6 LAW & Soc. REV. 631 (1972). In that survey, 65% of 
the respondents endorsed a "procedural fairness norm"-that they would consider a de-
cision to be fair if arrived at through fair procedures, without regard to the specific out-
come-while only 20% disagreed. Id. at 633. The respondents also reported a signifi-
cantly greater willingness to obey a decision they strongly disagreed with, so long as the 
court used fair procedures. Id. at 635. 
Other research has demonstrated that people assess the legitimacy of the judicial sys-
tem both by whether they agree with the substantive result and by the fairness of the 
method used to reach that result. See Barkun, Law and Social Revolution: Millenarian· 
ism and the Legal System, 6 LAW & Soc. REV. 113 (1971). 
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dissatisfaction among the defendant group with the result in 
King, and into the extent of resistance to the court-ordered rem-
edy. The first response, presented in Table A, indicated substan-
tial discontent with the district court ruling, particularly among 
the teachers. 
TABLE A 
REACTION TO: "I WAS SATISFIED WITH THE RESULT IN THE CASE." 
Total defendant group 
Teachers only 
Strongly 
Agree Agree Disagree 
0 
0 
7 
1 
3 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
14 
10 
In contrast, however, Table B shows that the defendant group 
did not report great resistance on their part to the relief ordered 
by the court, despite their substantial dissatisfaction with the 
holding. 
TABLE B 
RESPONSE To: "How WouLD You CHARACTERIZE YouR PARTICIPATION 
IN THE TRAINING PROGRAM?" 
Total defendant group 
Teachers only 
Eager Willing Reluctant Involuntary 
2 
1 
8 
6 
3 
3 
1 
1 
Nonetheless, notwithstanding the general lukewarm willingness 
to abide by the court order, four of eleven teachers responding79 
did not willingly participate in the training program-and it 
seems likely that there was more resistance in fact than the 
questionnaires revealed. 80 
After addressing these threshold questions, the survey ex-
79. The number of responses to a particular question do not always equal the total 
number of persons responding to the questionnaire; some respondents did not answer 
every question. 
80. From newspaper reports and from my conversations with teachers and others in-
volved in the black English case, I am certain there was serious passive resistance to the 
court-ordered relief that the questionnaires did not reveal. Most teachers were willing to 
attend the training sessions, but the sessions were resented and perceived as unneces-
sary. Teachers harboring these sentiments likely did not fully absorb the lessons of the 
remedial program. 
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plored the potential conflicts of interest within the defendant 
group during the liability stage of the litigation. Three major de-
cisions regarding outcome goals and strategy choices raised po-
tential conflicts among the multiple interests of the defendant 
group. As detailed in Table C, the questionnaire asked the de-
fendant group whether they felt the court should find for the 
plaintiffs on the question of liability, whether the main objective 
of the defendant's lawyer should have been a compromise settle-
ment agreement or a defense on the merits, and whether the 
School Board should have appealed the district court ruling. 81 
TABLE C 
RESPONSE To: "DID You WANT THE CouRT To FIND FOR PLAINTIFFS 
OR DEFENDANTS?" 
Total defendant group 
Teachers only 
Plaintiff Defendant 
7 
2 
15 
9 
RESPONSE TO: "SHOULD THE MAIN GOAL OF THE DEFENSE LAWYERS 
HAVE BEEN To DEFEND OR To SETTLE?" 
Total defendant group 
Teachers only 
Settle 
7 
2 
Defend 
16 
9 
RESPONSE TO: "DID You WANT THE SCHOOL BOARD To APPEAL?" 
Total defendant group 
Teachers only 
No Yes 
9 
1 
13 
7 
Although, not surprisingly, a majority felt that the school system 
should have been vindicated on the merits, a sizeable minority 
wanted the court to find for the plaintiffs. Similarly, a substan-
tial portion of the defendant group would have settled the law-
suit rather than going to trial. This represents a significant con-
flict of interest; defense counsel's representation of the majority 
view at the liability stage evidently necessitated the suppression 
of strong opposing sentiment. 
This conflict of interest among the defendant group was even 
more dramatic regarding the question of whether the district 
81. See supra pt. I 8. 
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court decision should have been appealed. A preponderance of 
the defendant group-including an overwhelming majority of 
teachers-desired an appeal of the district court's ruling. The 
decision of a narrow majority of the School Board not to appeal, 
however, was legally binding.82 The suppression of this dissent-
ing interest may have left those involved in effectuating the 
court-ordered relief with the impression that the legal process 
had not been procedurally fair. 
The questions concerning conflict of interest at the relief stage 
were more complex, reflecting the greater complexity of the deci-
sions and interests involved. The questionnaire presented a 
choice among two options for each of eight facets of the court's 
remedial plan: one based upon the plan formulated by the de-
fendants and accepted by the court;83 the other embodying sug-
gestions and objections made by the plaintiffs to the defendants' 
plan.84 Table D presents the results; surprisingly, the defendant 
group as a whole strongly preferred plaintiffs' suggestions rather 
than the plan actually enacted for two of the eight features 
tested, while the teachers strongly favored an additional third 
facet of the plan advanced by the plaintiffs. Both the teachers 
and the total defendant group strongly favored three features of 
the enacted plan over the plaintiffs' suggestions, while reaction 
to the other features tested was equivocal. 
TABLED 
RESPONSES REGARDING SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE REMEDIAL PLAN 
Consultation with parents811 
Total defendant group 
Teachers only 
Consultation between teachers and 
language arts consultant" 
Total defendant group 
Teachers only 
Plaintiffs' 
Version 
15* 
7* 
14* 
6* 
Defendant's 
Version 
4 
3 
5 
3 
(* indicates clear majority) 
82. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
83. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
84. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. The questionnaire did not indicate 
that the options were based upon either the defendants' or plaintiffs' remedial plans. 
85. The plaintiffs proposed that there be regular consultation between the school and 
the parents; the defendants' plan did not provide for such consultation. 
86. The plan proposed by the defendants called for consultation between the teach-
ers and the language arts consultant at the teacher's request; the plaintiffs sought regu-
larly scheduled consultations. 
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TABLED-Continued 
Plaintiffs' 
Version 
Materials selection81 
Total defendant group 
Teachers only 
Help plaintiffs in class or out of • 
class88 
Total defendant group 
Teachers only 
Composition of plan management 
team89 
Total defendant group 
Teachers only 
Parents' attendance at 
management team meetings90 
Total defendant group 
Teachers only 
Appointment of consultant111 
Total defendant group 
Teachers only 
Focus of evaluation programH 
Total defendant group 
Teachers only 
4 
2 
5 
2 
9 
5 
8 
4 
7 
4 
11 
8* 
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Defendant's 
Version 
10* 
6* 
9* 
6* 
10 
5 
10 
5 
15* 
6* 
10 
1 
(* indicates clear majority) 
Again, apparently a very sizeable conflicting interest among the 
defendant group was suppressed-this time in the process of 
drafting a remedial program. It seems probable that the admin-
istration did not intentionally muffle the conflicting views of the 
87. The plaintiffs wanted the language arts consultant to select teaching materials, 
while the court-enacted plan called for the teachers to select materials. 
88. Plaintiffs proposed that the children be given special help only in their regular 
class; defendants' plan allowed children to be removed from their classroom for such 
special help. 
89. Plaintiffs proposed that they be able to select 2 of the 12 members of the Super-
vision and Management Team; defendants' plan provided that the supervision team 
would be appointed exclusively by the school system administration. 
90. The plan formulated by the defendants did not allow plaintiffs' parents to attend 
the Supervision and Management Team meetings; plaintiffs wanted these meetings to be 
open to the parents. 
91. The plaintiffs proposed that the appointment of the external expert consultant in 
linguistics be by agreement of the parties; defendants' plan allowed the school adminis-
tration to act alone in making this appointment. 
92. The plaintiffs felt that evaluation of the program should focus primarily on the 
child; defendants' plan provided that evaluation would concentrate upon the teachers. 
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teachers or others in the defendant group regarding the ele-
ments of the remedial plan; rather, the views of the individuals 
within the defendant entity were not solicited and were there-
fore unknown. 
While the questionnaire thus exposed various conflicts of in-
terest between the defendant group and the positions asserted 
by defense counsel, the more important questions bear on the 
actors' perception of procedural unfairness. For purposes of 
identifying the sources of resistance to court-ordered remedies, 
the critical inquiry must be whether those responsible for imple-
menting the relief sensed these conflicts and the consequent 
suppression of interests. Therefore, the survey asked the defen-
dant group whether they had any views or positions that were 
not advanced by the lawyers, either at the liability or remedy 
stages of the litigation. As indicated in Table E, the defendant 
group had an extremely strong perception that their views and 
positions at the liability phase were not fully communicated to 
the court. 
TABLE E 
RESPONSE TO: "DID You HAVE ANY VIEWS NOT PRESENTED BY THE 
LAWYERS?" 
Yes No 
At the liability phase 
Total defendant group 18 3 
Teachers only 9 1 
At the remedy phase • 
Total defendant group 7 16 
Teachers only 3 8 
This perceived inadequacy may relate to tactical choices or mis-
conceptions as to legally material arguments, and might well 
have been eliminated by greater interaction between the defen-
dant group and their counsel-even if the actual choice of tac-
tics did not change. 88 
93. As noted previously, see supra text accompanying notes 81-82, defense counsel 
represented the views of the majority of the defendant entity regarding two major tacti-
cal choices in the litigation, and suppressed the dominant view only when obligated by 
the legally binding decision of the School Board not to appeal the district court ruling. 
As· an ethical matter, the attorney likely could not have acted otherwise. See supra note 
51. Dissenting individuals, however, might ·have intervened to press their position, see, 
e.g., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 .(D.C. Cir. 1969), or, alternatively, plaintiffs' counsel 
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In contrast, as set forth in Table E, the defendant group did 
not perceive such significant flaws in representation of their in-
terests at the relief stage. This seemingly conflicts with the find-
ings reported in Table D that the remedial plan proposed by 
defense counsel and implemented by the court actually con-
tained several provisions supported by only a minority of the de-
fendant group. 
This discrepancy resulted apparently because the defendant 
group was not well informed regarding the proposed features of 
the remedial plan, or of plaintiffs' counterproposals, and so was 
unaware that its interests were being suppressed.H Though un-
informed individuals may not resist the remedial plan on the 
grounds that their interests were suppressed, they cannot be ex-
pected to support it fully. Their stake in the plan's success 
would have been greater had they been advised of the proposed 
program for relief and been given an opportunity to inject their 
various viewpoints. 
Pursuing the issue of procedural unfairness, the survey next 
explored perceptions about whose interests had been principally 
:represented before the court. The results, presented in Table F, 
indicate a strong sense among the defendant group that defense 
counsel had advanced primarily the interests of the school ad-
ministration, particularly at the relief stage. Similarly, Table G 
details the perceptions of the def endartt group concerning the 
plaintiffs' interest advocacy. The belief of individual members of 
the defendant entity that the plaintiffs were inadequately repre-
sented, whether or not accurate, would contribute to their as-
could have represented their view, see, e.g., Dierks v. Thompson, 414 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 
1969). On the other hand, because members of the defendant school system would be 
required to participate in any plan the School Board chose to implement, regardless of a 
court order, they might have lacked a legally cognizable interest sufficient to justify in-
tervention. See Y eazell, supra note 66, at 252-55. 
94. This conclusion draws support from the responses to the questionnaire. Eight of 
22 respondents among the defendant group indicated that they had no disagreement 
with the remedial plan as a whole. When asked to choose between plaintiffs' and defen-
dants' versions on eight specific features of the plan, however, each of those eight respon-
dents preferred the plaintiffs' proposal for at least one feature, and two chose the plain-
tiffs' version for as many as five facets of the remedial plan. This appears to indicate that 
the defendant group had, at best, only limited knowledge of the program formulated by 
defense counsel and ultimately accepted by the court. 
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sessment of the fairness of the judicial process. 
TABLE F 
RESPONSE To: "OF THE FOLLOWING GROUPS, WHOSE PosITION Dm THE 
DEFENSE LAWYERS PRIMARILY REPRESENT?" 
At the liability phase 
School Board 
Administration 
Teachers 
Defense lawyers 
At the remedy phase 
School Board 
Administration 
Teachers 
Defense lawyers 
Responses by: 
Total defendant Teachers 
group only 
4 
14 
7 
5 
5 
14 
4 
4 
1 
6 
3 
2 
3 
6 
1 
0 
TABLE G 
RESPONSE TO: "OF THE FOLLOWING GROUPS, WHOSE POSITION DID 
THE PLAINTIFFS' LAWYERS PRIMARILY REPRESENT?" 
Responses by: 
Total defendant Teachers 
group only 
At the liability phase 
Plaintiff children 2 0 
Plaintiffs' parents 2 0 
Student Advocacy Center 16 9 
Plaintiffs' lawyers 11 5 
At the remedy phase 
Plaintiff children 3 1 
Plaintiffs' parents 5 0 
Student Advocacy Center 13 7 
Plaintiffs' lawyers 10 6 
The defendant group identified the Student Advocacy Center 
as having the greatest influence upon the litigation at both the 
liability and relief stages, with the lawyers' own interests run-
ning a close second. This perception of the plaintiffs' representa-
tion, combined with the defendant group's opinion of its own 
representation, evinces a jaundiced view of the legitimacy of the 
judicial process. The appearance of procedural unfairness is 
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manifest; the defendant group perceived neither the actors most 
directly responsible for implementing the court-ordered relief, 
nor the actors for whom the relief purportedly was ordered, as 
the primary protagonists in the litigation. 
C. Reducing Bureaucratic Resistance to Judicially Mandated 
Relief 
Dissatisfaction and resistance to court orders implementing 
social reform flow not only from the result of a particular adjudi-
cation, but also from the process by which the decision is 
reached. The legal system can manipulate outcomes to avert dis-
content only to a limited extent.95 If litigation seeking institu-
tional change is to be maximally effective, however, courts 
should modify their processes in order to generate support and 
voluntary compliance.96 
The main procedural deficiency in social reform litigation 
identified by this study is that the lower levels of the bureau-
cracy are excluded from active participation in the lawsuit. Al-
though this exclusion may superficially seem appropriate for 
reasons of economy, the apparently inexorable result-as 
demonstrated in King-is that those ultimately responsible for 
effectuating a court order requiring institutional change will re-
sist that order because they feel uninvolved and unrepresented 
in the process. 
As an initial response, courts should encourage counsel for 
95. The court should certainly ignore the defendant group's desires, though not their 
legal arguments, concerning liability. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Profes-
sor Yeazell argues that the desires of the injured group seeking reform should be disre-
garded as well, so that the judge would fashion a remedy solely with reference to the 
policies underlying the substantive law. See Yeazell, supra note 51, at 115-19. Yet, while 
admittedly the relief granted in litigation seeking institutional change should advance 
substantive policy aims, and not merely "some tangentially related gpal of the parties," 
id. at 1118, the courts should nonetheless be reluctant to slight the interests of the in-
jured group at the relief stage. It is tempting to mistake traditional remedies for the only 
proper remedies; such is the received tradition in which the remedy "ftow[s] ineluctably" 
from the liability determination, see Chayes, supra note 26, at 1282-83, 1293-94. Often-
times, there may exist equally legitimate alternative methods to effectuate substantive 
rights-and the injured may well be more likely than the judge to understand the most 
efficient means to achieve the desired end. My proposal envisions a dialogue between the 
court and the parties on the appropriate scope and method of relief, that could utilize 
the insights of the parties without sacrificing substantive policy aims. 
96. For an expanded analysis of philosophical principles underlying the adversary 
process that lead to the suppression of interests within complex parties affected by social 
reform litigation, as well as a proposed new theory of interest analysis and advocacy, see 
Wilton, Functional Interest Advocacy in Modern Complex Litigation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 
37 (1982). 
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complex institutional entities to consider the "client" as com-
prised of individuals from all levels of the bureaucracy. This 
would mean, therefore, that even lower level actors would be 
kept apprised of the lawsuit and would be solicited for their 
views on litigation goals and strategy. 91 Such interaction be-
tween counsel and the defendant group can be achieved either 
by informal suggestions or formal court orders. Thus, in King, 
Judge Joiner might easily have required the School Board to in-
clude the teachers in the process of formulating a proposed re-
medial plan for the court's scrutiny. 
Counsel cannot be relied upon, however, to be entirely candid 
in presenting the interests of all the members of the bureau-
cracy. When the King School teachers favor a position different 
from an option endorsed by the School Board,98 for example, the 
lawyer must vigorously advocate the interests of the 
Board-even at the expense of suppressing the teachers' view-
point. Therefore, the court itself often_ must solicit the views of 
groups such as the teachers in King. 99 When the court seeks the 
viewpoints of lower levels of bureaucracies, 100 not only does the 
97. Cf. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 US. 89 (1981) (communication between coun-
sel and the class notifies class members of the lawsuit, enabling them to make strategic 
choices and to contribute factual information on the merits of the litigation; such com-
munication cannot be prohibited absent a finding of potential abuse). 
98. See, e.g., supra Tables C & D. 
99. Courts should solicit rather than surmise the viewpoints of the defendant group; 
frequently, courts may err in their assumptions regarding a group's preferences in litiga-
tion strategy. In Ward v. Luttrell, 292 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. La. 1968), for example, the 
court refused to certify a class of working women seeking to challenge the constitutional-
ity of laws restricting women from working certain hours or under certain conditions, 
baldly asserting that many working women would not want to forego the "protection" 
provided by those laws. See id. at 168. Similarly, in King, the support among the teach-
ers for the plaintiffs' position on liability might not have been expected, although it was 
revealed by the survey, see supra Table C. Furthermore, the teachers would be pre-
sumed to support the Superintendent's remedial plan, rather than the plaintiffs' coun-
terproposals, yet the questionnaire responses were to the contrary on several facets of . 
the proposed relief, see supra Table D. 
Moreover, even aside from the question of whether the court can accurately discern 
the opinions of a complex party, participation in the process is a goal to be fostered in 
itself. Because subjective satisfaction of actors such as the King School teachers must be 
one major objective of a court enmeshed in social reform ligitation, see supra notes 72-
73, 75-78 and accompanying text, having the teachers express their own views to the 
court. represents the most effective way to involve them personally in the adjudication 
and thus increase their perception of procedural fairness, see Yeazell, supra note 66, at 
256-59. 
100. The precise mechanism to be employed for achieving greater participation 
among the defendant group must be tailored to the problems of the individual case. See 
generally Project, Institutional Reform, supra note 51, at 909-27. In most cases, two 
commonly used devices would provide the court with a ready means for soliciting diverse 
viewpoints. First, the court could periodically distribute a sampling notice when con-
fronted with new issues in the litigation, which ·would describe the alternatives under 
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remedy become more effective because of the increased percep-
tion of procedural fairness, 101 but also the quality of relief in-
creases because the court becomes more fully cognizant of infor-
mation and viewpoints that may be important to the final 
result. 102 
CONCLUSION 
Courts involved in social reform litigation cannot ignore the 
dissatisfaction and resistance generated by their orders for insti-
tutional change, or such sentiments may undermine the legiti-
macy of the judicial process. At one level, discontent with judi-
cial involvement in social reform cases may reflect a sense that 
such litigation tends to reflect the interests of reform-oriented 
organizations and attorneys, rather than the desires of the puta-
tive parties in interest. Indeed, in King, the ultimate resolution 
of the litigation spanned far beyond the concerns and desires 
expressed initially by the parents and schoolchildren involved in 
the case. · 
At another level, the process by which decisions are reached in 
social reform cases may itself engender resistance to judicial ac-
tivism. For too long, the legal system has treated complex bu-
reaucratic defendants in lawsuits seeking institutional reform as 
homogeneous entities having unified purposes and interests. Al-
though this approach may be a justifiable simplification when 
the issues at stake do not concern all levels of the bureaucracy, 
its flaws become apparent in litigation aimed at obtaining 
changes in institutional operations. As exemplified by King, con-
flicting views among the defendant group-especially among 
consideration and invite response. See generally 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1793 (1972); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LmGATION pt. I § 1.45 
(4th ed. 1977); Project, Institutional Reform, supra note 51, at 881-83. The results of the 
sampling should be made available to all parties and the court, which could encourage 
follow-up investigation by counsel. 
Second, the court could canvass the opinions of the defendant group by holding open 
hearings after giving notice of the questions under consideration. Those potentially af-
fected by the litigation would have the opportunity to present their views in a public 
hearing-representing but a small extension of the conception of litigation as a "town 
meeting" enunciated in Yeazell, supra note 66, at 256-59. See also Project, Institutional 
Reform, supra note 51, at 908. Ideally, these hearings would not be subject to evidentiary 
rules, which could constrain participation. Because legally inadmissible information 
might be produced, as in discovery proceedings, it may be preferable in some instances 
for a master to preside who would summarize the relevant information for the judge. 
101. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
102. See Note, supra note 69, at 439-40. 
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those actors in the lowest levels of the bureaucracy, most di-
rectly responsible for ultimately implementing a remedial 
plan-will almost inevitably be suppressed to some extent. This 
suppression of views causes dissatisfaction within the bureau-
cracy; those distanced from the litigation may well view the legal 
system as procedurally unfair, and thus may resist court-ordered 
alterations in institutional policy. 
Courts should minimize this resistance and focus their reme-
dies more directly on the real grievances of the parties by en-
couraging those who will be affected by the case to participate 
actively in the litigation. Careful consideration of the interests 
and concerns of those individuals critically important to the suc-
cess of a remedial order will greatly enhance the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of judicial involvement in social reform. 

